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Rorty’s Metaphilosophy and the 
Critique of Epistemology
Abstract 
Richard Rorty is a contemporary philosopher of analytic philosophical tradition who shif-
ted his career to a metaphilosophical critique of epistemology. The basis for Rorty’s critique 
lies in his rejection of Cartesian dualism, which leads him to a conclusion that every attempt 
at achieving truth by the way of knowing essences is destined for failure. Instead, Rorty 
argues for a search for understanding via conversation – a process which he called edifica-
tion – and which would lead to the elimination of the epistemological problem of knowledge 
altogether. His metaphilosophical endeavor wants hermeneutics to supplant epistemology 
and become the fundamental philosophical approach. However, Rorty underemphasizes 
the importance of truth for hermeneutics, a deficiency of his which the paper will try to 
amend in order to show that Rorty’s skepticism regarding truth makes it problematic for 
his position to claim rapport with hermeneutics. After detailing Rorty’s metaphilosophical 
programme, which was mainly established in Philosophy	 and	 the	Mirror	 of	Nature, the 
paper will explore the (in)compatibility of his position with hermeneutics, most notably 
with Gadamer’s. This leads to the conclusion that it would be a mistake to consider Rorty’s 
(meta)philosophy as an offshoot of hermeneutics or being completely compatible with it, 







our	 stemming	 from	 his	 neopragmatism	 and	 anti-Platonism.	With	 his	most	
prominent	and,	by	some	interpreters,	the	most	controversial	work	titled	Phi-





























































losophy,	and	 then	direct	 it	 to	another	path.	This	 is	evident	 in	almost	every	


























and	 cognition	 as	 the	 ultimate	 societal	 goal,8	 and	which	was	 the	 incent	 for	
Rorty	to	supplant	the	goal	of	cognition	with	“aesthetic	enhancement”,9  just 
like	Dewey	did.	Susan	Haack,	a	keen	critic	of	Rorty	wrote	a	short	play	ironi-
cally	 titled	“We	Pragmatists”	 in	which	Rorty	and	Peirce	 lead	an	 imaginary	
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of	 thought	 or	 tradition	 exactly	 because	 he	 aims	 at	 diversifying	philosophy	
with	his	metaphilosophical	approach,	and	considers	supporting	one	‘side’	or	








two	decades	before	Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,	Rorty	had	already	














Rorty	 thus	wants	 to	 remove	 the	 paradigmatic	 function	 from	 epistemology	
and	give	it	to	hermeneutics,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	he	does	not	want	
for	hermeneutics	to	take	over	the	problems	of	epistemology	because	for	him	
“hermeneutics	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 hope	 that	 the	 cultural	 space	 left	 by	 the	









Rorty’s Critique of Epistemology













as	objective,	 immutable,	and	 thus	knowable.	Rorty’s	critique	of	both	 these	
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“anachronistically	 impose	 enough	 of	 our	 problems	 and	 vocabulary	 on	 the	
dead”	to	make	them	contemporary	conversational	partners,	or	we	should	ap-
preciate	our	 interpretative	ability	by	“placing	 them	 in	 the	context”	of	 their	
time and thought.26	The	former	choice	was	the	path	the	analytic	philosophy	
took,	Rorty	continues,	by	plucking	the	intellectuals	out	of	their	historical	and	
lingual	context	and	 trying	 to	assimilate	 them	into	a	contemporary	one.	For	
Rorty	 the	 solution	 is	 simple	 –	 the	 dilemma	 is	 nonexistent,	 and	we	 should	
implement	both	approaches	when	analyzing	historical	 texts	and	 thinkers,	a	
solution	which	 also	 tacitly	 inaugurates	 hermeneutics	 as	 the	 stepping	 stone	
towards	a	more	successful	philosophical	method.	With	this	move,	Rorty	made	
his	 linguistic	 turn	by	 shifting	 the	 focus	 from	epistemology	 toward	 the	 lin-





Rorty	 recognized	 and	 emphasized.	For	 this	 reason,	 his	metaphilosophy	 al-
ways	discusses	the	wellbeing	of	‘philosophy’,	instead	of	talking	about	‘ana-
lytic’	or	‘continental’	tradition.	Rorty	thus	attempts	unifying	what	was	never	





great	 ease	 by	 invoking	 philosophers	 such	 as	Heidegger,	Wittgenstein,	 and	
Derrida	alongside	Dewey,	Austin,	Kuhn,	and	Quine.
Edification
The  term  edification	 comes	 from	 the	Latin	word	aedificatio,	which	means	
‘building’,	and	also	‘construction’	in	the	sense	of	constructing	oneself.	The	























He	 also	 extends	 his	metaphilosophy	 through	 edification	 in	which	 tensions	
between	epistemology	and	hermeneutics	continue.	Edification	is	not	possible	
under	epistemological	premises	because	epistemology	positions	itself	as	hav-
ing	 a	 special	 understanding	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	mind,	 an	 understanding	
which	other	disciplines	and	cultures	should	build	upon.	This	is	unacceptable	
23   
R.	Rorty,	Philosophy and the Mirror of Na-
ture,	p.	69.
24   
Ibid.,	p.	137.
25	   
Richard	Rorty,	“Derrida	on	Language,	Being	
and	Abnormal	 Philosophy”,	 The Journal of 
Philosophy	74	(1977)	11,	pp.	673–681,	p.	679.
26	   
Richard	Rorty,	“The	Historiography	of	Phi-
losophy:	 Four	 Genres”,	 in:	 Richard	 Rorty,	
Jerome	 B.	 Schneewind,	 Quentin	 Skinner	
(eds.), Philosophy in History: Essays on the 




27	   
Ibid.,	p.	360.
28	   
Ibid.,	p.	372.
29   
Ibid.,	p.	360.
30	   
Ibid.








losophy”.	Edifying	philosophers,	 such	as	Rorty,	 express	 “distrust”	 towards	
the	Platonic	idea	that	“man’s	essence	is	to	be	a	knower	of	essences”.32	They	
are	also	distrustful	towards	‘progress’,	they	cannot	stand	the	thought	of	their	
vocabulary	being	 institutionalized,	 they	are	cynical,	and	 they	deplore	com-
mensurability;	 they	 communicate	 poetically,	 through	 satire,	 parodies,	 and	
aphorisms;	they	“know	their	work	loses	its	point	when	the	period	they	were	
reacting	against	is	over”	so	they	“destroy	for	the	sake	of	their	own	genera-
tion”;	they	are	abnormal	and	they	reject	the	search	for	objective	truth.33 On the 

























critique	of	 epistemology	and	 the	mind,	but	 that	he	also	deepened	 the	 term	
‘Dasein’	which	denotes	man	as	a	being	that	has	no	limiting	essence,	but	is	a	
myriad	of	possibilities	which	can	be	realized	through	self-awareness	of	those	





Rorty on Primacy of Hermeneutics over Epistemology
Definitions	 or,	more	 precisely,	 characteristics	 of	 epistemology	 and	 herme-
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or	may	not	be	taken	as	true.	As	Petit	points	out,	Rorty	did interpret and use 
‘incommensurability’	in	such	a	way	because	he	did	not	discuss	incommen-



















In	Rorty’s	 defence,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 differentiate	 his	 distrust	 of	 commen-
surability	through	the	mind,	which	would	lead	to	knowledge, and his belief 
in	incommensurability	(contingency)	of	language	which	is	based	on	under-
standing.	Regarding	 the	 former,	Rorty	sees	no	solution	out	of	 the	problem	
and	 thus,	 the	aim	of	conversation	 is	not	and	cannot	be	knowledge	because	
such	a	request	cannot	be	ever	fulfilled.	Regarding	the	latter,	the	holistic,	i.e.	






Rorty	 also	discussed	 abnormality	 and	 incommensurability	 of	 discourses	 in	





various	 vocabularies	we	 have	 employed	 and	 find	 a	metavocabulary	which	
somehow	takes	account	of	all possible	vocabularies,	all	possible	ways	judg-
ing	and	 feeling”.50	At	 this	point,	Rorty	again	 invokes	his	 sharp	claims	 that	
the	search	for	truth	and	knowledge	is	a	failed	project	which	philosophy	took	
over	from	the	Enlightenment,	bringing	over	from	science	 the	“old	struggle	















Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature	–	that	the	consciousness	of	the	inability	
of	attaining	 truth	and	knowledge	should,	and	would	 lead	 to	more	dialogue	
and	more	understanding.	The	hermeneutic	notion	of	understanding	pertains	
mostly	to	texts,	but	Heidegger’s	and	Gadamer’s	‘understanding’	is	a	broader	










form of interpretation. This interpretation is made through language as a me-
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description	can	be	found	 in	 the	claim	that	“hermeneutics	sees	 the	relations	
between	 various	 discourses	 as	 those	 of	 strands	 in	 a	 possible	 conversation,	


























that	accompanied	it	since	its	origination,	until	 the	scientistic	 ideal	 imposed	
itself	in	the	form	of	epistemology.	Universality,	both	methodologically	and	in	
the	knowing	process,	is	not	standard	in	epistemology	because	epistemology	











use	 conversation	 to	 reveal	 the	 interlocutor’s experience	 of	 the	world,	 and	
not	to	impose	one’s	own.	This	context	also	demonstrates	the	theoretical	ap-
plication	of	the	hermeneutic	circle,	which	Rorty	parallels	with	other	holistic	













imposed	 itself	 as	 a	 paradigm	 to	 other	modes	 of	 human	 existence,	 such	 as	
culture	or	religion.58
Thus	 far,	 and	 for	 the	most	part,	Rorty	 correctly	 interprets	Gadamer’s	 anti-
scientism	and	finds	it	similar	to	his	metaphilosophical	agenda.	However,	the	
problem	becomes	evident	when	one	turns	attention	to	what	Rorty	leaves	out	
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tation.	 In	 this	vein,	 it	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	Rorty	agreeing	with	hermeneutics	
even	if	he	would	agree	that	truth	is	eventually	possible	by	the	process	of	the	





















































idea of Vorwissen (foreknowing), in Heidegger of Vorstruktur (forestructure), 
and Gadamer of Vorurteil (prejudgement).	These	notions	encompass	the	idea	
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of	 special	 importance	 to	Gadamer	who	 discussed	 the	 need	 to	 “rehabilitate	
authority	and	tradition”	and	“prejudice	as	a	precondition	of	understanding”.63 
Kuhn’s,	and	other	postpositivists’	inability	to	see	that	the	irrational	and	sub-






tics.	The	situation	 is	 thus	of	a	closed	system	of	 reference	and	 justification,	
developed	in	Heidegger	as	a	‘hermeneutic	circle’.	But	hermeneutics	still	con-


















to	 offer	 an	 alternative	 to	 scientific	 method	 because	 hermeneutics	 is	 not	 “a	
method	of	attaining	truth”,	Rorty	quotes	Gadamer.64 And he is right. Gadamer 
never	wanted	to	provide	the	method	of	truth,	lest	his	whole	work	would	be	
pointless.	Instead,	Gadamer	is	eager	to	emancipate	the	human	sciences	with	




























that	his	aim	is	not	 to	create	a	 theory	of	knowledge	according	 to	 the	recipe	
established	by	the	scientific	method,	which	Rorty	interpreted	correctly,	but	in	
the	very	second	part	of	the	sentence,	left	out	by	Rorty,	Gadamer	claims	that	
“yet	 it	 too	 is	 concerned	with	 knowledge	 and	with	 truth”.67	Rockmore	 also	
observes	 that	Rorty	“turns	Gadamer	 inside	out”	by	claiming	 that	Gadamer	
rejects	 truth	 and	 commensurability.68	Gadamer	does	 reject	 commensurabil-
ity,	but	only	that	commensurability	which	seeks	to	conform	human	sciences	
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To	 secure	 its	 future,	 Rorty	 rightfully	 concludes,	 philosophy	 should	 not	 be	
naturalistic	or	positivistic	sciences	will	“push	it	aside”;	if	it	becomes	too	his-
toricist,	literary	criticism	and	similar	human	sciences	will	“swallow	it	up”.71 















Readers	 inclined	 towards	 the	 so-called	 continental	 tradition	will	 hardly	 be	









from	 the	 implications	 of	 postmodernism,	 it	 can	 hardly	 defend	 itself	 from	
the arguments that aim to shake its tradition and argumentative foundations. 
Rorty	identified	the	criticism	against	the	historically	oriented	continental	phi-
losophy,	which	 regularly	and	attentively	 reevaluates	 its	 tradition,	as	a	 fatal	
deficiency	 of	 contemporary	 epistemology.	And	while	 contemporary	 episte-
mology	generally	 focuses	on	 the	 foundation	 and	possibility	 of	 knowledge,	







Richard Rorty suvremeni je filozof analitičke filozofijske tradicije koji je svoje karijerno usmje-
renje skrenuo na metafilozofijsku kritiku epistemologije. Osnova Rortyjeve kritike leži u njegovu 
odbijanju kartezijanskog dualizma, što ga dovodi do zaključka da je svaki pokušaj dosezanja 
istine putem znanja o bitima osuđen na propast. Umjesto toga, Rorty argumentira u korist 
traženja razumijevanja putem razgovora – postupka koji zove eidifikacija – koji bi vodio do 
potpunog uklanjanja epistemologijskog problema znanja. Njegov metafilozofijski poduhvat želi 
hermeneutikom zamijeniti epistemologiju i time je uspostaviti kao temeljni filozofijski pristup. 
Međutim, Rorty nedovoljno naglašava važnost istine za hermeneutiku. To je manjak koji će 
ovo istraživanje pokušati nadoknaditi da bi pokazalo kako je Rortyjev skepticizam po pitanju 
istine problematičan za njegovu vlastitu poziciju bliskosti s hermeneutikom. Nakon opisivanja 
Rortyjeva metafilozofijskog programa, temeljno uspostavljenog u Filozofija	i	ogledalo	prirode, 
rad istražuje (ne)kompatibilnost Rortyjeve pozicije s hermeneutikom, prvenstveno s Gademero-
vom. Dolazimo do zaključka da bi pogrešno bilo smatrati Rortyjevu (meta)filozofiju izdankom 
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Rortys Metaphilosophie und die Kritik der Epistemologie
Zusammenfassung
Richard Rorty ist ein zeitgenössischer Philosoph der analytischen philosophischen Tradition, 
der seine berufliche Ausrichtung auf die metaphilosophische Kritik der Epistemologie richtete. 
Das Fundament von Rortys Kritik liegt in seiner Ablehnung des kartesianischen Dualismus, 
was ihn zu der Schlussfolgerung führt, dass jeder Versuch, durch das Wissen über die Wesen zur 
Wahrheit zu gelangen, zum Scheitern verurteilt ist. Stattdessen argumentiert Rorty dafür, durch 
Konversation nach Verständnis zu suchen – ein Prozess, den er als Edifikation bezeichnet – der 
zur vollständigen Beseitigung des epistemologischen Problems des Wissens führen würde. Sein 
metaphilosophisches Bestreben ist es, die Epistemologie durch die Hermeneutik zu ersetzen 
und sie damit als grundlegenden philosophischen Ansatz zu etablieren. Allerdings betont Rorty 
die Wichtigkeit der Wahrheit für die Hermeneutik nur unzureichend. Dies ist ein Nachteil, den 
diese Studie auszugleichen sucht, um aufzuweisen, wie problematisch Rortys Skeptizismus in 
puncto Wahrheit für seine eigene Position der Nähe zur Hermeneutik ist. Nach der Darlegung 
von Rortys metaphilosophischem Programm, das in Der	Spiegel	der	Natur gründlich verankert 
ist, erforscht die Arbeit die (In-)Kompatibilität von Rortys Position mit der Hermeneutik, in 
erster Linie mit der von Gadamer. Wir kommen zu dem Fazit, dass es unzutreffend wäre, Rortys 
(Meta-)Philosophie als Ableger der Hermeneutik zu betrachten oder sie als vollständig damit 
kompatibel einzuschätzen, wenn man bedenkt, dass er den gesellschaftlichen Problemen den 




La métaphilosophie de Rorty et sa critique de l’épistémologie
Résumé
Richard Rorty est un philosophe contemporain de tradition analytique qui a orienté sa carrière 
professionnelle vers une critique philosophique de la métaphilosophie. Le fondement de la phi-
losophie de Rorty repose sur son rejet du dualisme cartésien, ce qui le mène à la conclusion que 
toute tentative d’atteindre la vérité par la connaissance des essences est vouée à l’échec. Au 
lieu de cela, Rorty argumente en faveur d’une recherche de la compréhension par le biais de 
la conversation – procédé qu’il nomme édification – qui serait censée complètement remédier 
au problème épistémologique de la connaissance. Son entreprise métaphilosophique se donne 
pour ambition de remplacer l’herméneutique par l’épistémologie et ainsi de l’instituer en tant 
qu’approche philosophique fondamentale. Cependant, Rorty ne met pas suffisamment l’accent 
sur l’importance de la vérité pour l’herméneutique, insuffisance que cette recherche va tenter 
de pallier en vue de montrer que son scepticisme, pour ce qui est de la vérité, est problématique 
en ce qui concerne la relation d’affinité qu’entretient sa propre position avec l’herméneutique. 
Après avoir décrit le programme métaphilosophique de Rorty, clairement établi dans La philo-
sophie et le miroir de la nature, ce travail examine la (non) compatibilité de la position de Rorty 
avec l’herméneutique, principalement avec Gadamer. Nous arrivons à la conclusion qu’il serait 
fallacieux de considérer la (méta)philosophie de Rorty comme une branche de l’herméneutique, 
ou de penser qu’elle serait complètement compatible avec elle, tout en gardant en vue qu’il 
donne la priorité aux problèmes sociétales et non à la vérité.
Mots-clés
Richard	Rorty,	métaphilosophie,	herméneutique,	épistémologie,	édification,	vérité
